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NOTE
Plight of the Public Defender: Excessive
Caseload as a Non-Mitigating Factor in
Sanctions for Ethical Violations
Order, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017)
Taylor Payne *

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court stated in United States v.
Cronic, “Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.” 1 Indeed, the right to counsel contained in
the Sixth Amendment 2 is an indispensable protection of the “fundamental
right to a fair trial.” 3 This truth is perhaps most evident when an indigent
individual is accused of a crime and faces the loss of life or liberty. In 1963,
the landmark decision of Gideon v. Wainwright was handed down wherein
the Court for the first time held that indigent criminal defendants facing the
possibility of imprisonment must be provided counsel at the government’s
expense. 4 As the Court declared in the years following Gideon, “[N]o person
*

B.A., University of Missouri, 2015; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School
of Law, 2019; Associate Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2018–2019. I am grateful to
Professor Rodney Uphoff for his wisdom and guidance during the writing of this
Note, and I thank the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing process.
1. 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984) (quoting Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State
Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1956)).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); see also Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (“‘(The assistance of counsel) is one of the
safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to insure fundamental human
rights of life and liberty.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)); id.
at 344 (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”).
4. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws have
laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every defendant stands equal
before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized if the poor man charged
with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.
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may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor,
or felony, unless he [has the opportunity to be] represented by counsel at his
trial.” 5 Though states are obligated to provide counsel to indigent state defendants, the Court has made it clear that each state remains free to carry out
this obligation as it sees fit. 6 As a result, states have approached public defense in various ways. In some states, the right to counsel is provided on a
county-by-county or even town-by-town basis. 7 In others, however, public
defense is overseen at the state level. 8 Missouri is a state of the latter sort. 9
In addition to the United States Constitution, 10 the right to counsel for
indigent defendants in Missouri is commanded by the Missouri Constitution 11
and reiterated in Missouri’s Supreme Court Rules. 12 So what exactly does it
mean to have a right to counsel? The United States Supreme Court has long
held that pro forma appointment of counsel is not sufficient; effective and
competent assistance of counsel is required. 13
Id. at 344 (felonies); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 674 (2002) (suspended sentences); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 36–37 (1972) (misdemeanors); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (juvenile).
5. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37.
6. Know Your State, SIXTH AMEND. CTR., http://sixthamendment.org/knowyour-state/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See generally MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/aboutmspd/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
10. The right to counsel contained in the Sixth Amendment has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at
343 (quoting Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936)) (“[C]ertain
fundamental rights, safeguarded by the first eight amendments against federal action,
were also safeguarded against state action by the due process of law clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and among them the fundamental right of the accused to the
aid of counsel in a criminal prosecution.”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
11. See MO. CONST. of 1945, art. I, § 18(a) (“[I]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel.”).
12. MO. SUP. CT. R. 31.02. Persons accused of offenses, “the conviction of
which would probably result in confinement,” must be informed by the court of their
right to counsel should they be without counsel during their first appearance before a
judge. Id. Moreover, the court must inform the defendant of the court’s willingness
to appoint counsel to him should he be unable to afford representation on his own. Id.
The court’s duty to appoint counsel to an indigent defendant is only waived after a
defendant has been informed of his rights to counsel and intelligently waives them
nonetheless. Id.
13. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970) (“It has long been
recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.”); see also State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 225 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Mo. 2007)
(en banc) (“Any defendant that has exercised his right to counsel is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel, and courts should do the utmost to protect the defendant’s
right to adequate and competent representation.”); Taylor v. State, 262 S.W.3d 231,
249 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (“The Sixth Amendment affords all citizens facing criminal
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The Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct (“Missouri Rules”) require
just the same: competent representation. 14 In fact, the very first obligation
laid out in the Missouri Rules is the obligation to provide competent representation to a client. 15 Of course, the Missouri Rules require more than just
competence. They also require counsel to effectively communicate 16 with
clients, be diligent in their representation, 17 and much more. 18
The Missouri Rules apply to public defenders just as they do to every
other attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Missouri. However,
currently in Missouri, public defenders in particular often find themselves
incapable of conforming their representation with the Missouri Rules because
they have far too many cases, not enough time, and work under a system of
state government that cannot or will not provide adequate funding. 19 Like
any other attorney who violates the Missouri Rules, public defenders can be
sanctioned and even disbarred for failing to uphold their ethical obligations.
This Note discusses the thought-provoking ruling in In re Karl William
Hinkebein 20 and its implications for public defenders in Missouri. Part II of
this Note details the facts and holding of the case. Part III of this Note gives
a brief history of the Missouri State Public Defender System (“MSPD”),
highlighting its current shortcomings and challenges. Part III then discusses
the influential ethics opinion issued by the American Bar Association
(“ABA”) and the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA
Standards”).
Part IV of this Note analyzes the decision of the Supreme Court of Missouri to sanction Karl Hinkebein. Part V discusses the effect of Hinkebein on
public defenders around the state and the unforgiving circumstances in which
many public defenders find themselves. Finally, this Note concludes in Part
V with a brief discussion of potential systemic reforms to MSPD.

charges the right to effective assistance of counsel.”). Effective representation under
the Sixth Amendment requires appropriate “investigat[ion], prepar[ation], and present[ation of] the client’s case” by counsel. Id.
14. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.1; see also State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v.
Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 597 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (discussing that the Sixth
Amendment does not sanction pro forma appointment and that a court should consider counsel’s competency before ordering appointment).
15. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.1 (“A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness
and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”).
16. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.4.
17. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3.
18. See generally MO. SUP. CT. R. 4.
19. See infra Section III.B.
20. Order, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=117575 [hereinafter Hinkebein Order].
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Karl William Hinkebein (“Hinkebein”) is a public defender with
MSPD. 21 Hinkebein became licensed to practice law in the state of Missouri
in 1993. 22 At the time the instant case was filed, he had worked in the Central Appellate Post-Conviction Relief (“Appellate/PCR”) division of MSPD
for over twenty years, and his primary work consisted of representing indigent clients who moved, pro se, for post-conviction relief. 23
The instant case arose from a complaint filed by Darin Robinson with
the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel (“OCDC”). 24 Darin Robinson was a
client to whom Hinkebein had been assigned as counsel. 25 Robinson’s complaint to OCDC charged that Hinkebein failed to uphold his professional conduct obligations. 26 Specifically, Robinson asserted Hinkebein failed to keep
him informed about the status of his post-conviction case and failed to file
required motions. 27 Through investigation of Robinson’s complaint, OCDC
discovered Hinkebein failed to uphold his professional conduct obligations
with five additional clients to whom Hinkebein had been assigned as counsel. 28 The instant case thus encompassed Hinkebein’s professional conduct
violations relating to six different indigent defendants, including Robinson. 29
On March 31, 2016, OCDC filed an information charging Hinkebein
with violating Missouri Rules 4-1.3 (diligence) and 4-1.4 (communication). 30
Rule 4-1.3 mandates that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” 31 Rule 4-1.4 dictates that
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(2) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
and

21. Informant’s Brief at 7, In re Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017),
2017 WL 3195810, at *7.
22. Id.
23. Id.; see also David Carroll & Phyllis Mann, Missouri’s “Perfect Storm”
Explained, SIXTH AMEND. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2017), http://sixthamendment.org/missourisperfect-storm-explained/; see also MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15 (“Within [thirty] days after
an indigent movant files a pro se motion, the court shall cause counsel to be appointed
for the movant.”).
24. Informant’s Brief, supra note 21, at 8.
25. Id. at 8.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 10–12.
28. Id. at 8.
29. See id. at 9–23.
30. Id. at 8.
31. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3.
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(3) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation. 32

Hinkebein entered his appearance as Robinson’s counsel on February
14, 2011. 33 Hinkebein filed a motion for an extension of time to file an
amended Rule 29.15 motion 34 and was granted the extension of time to
March 13, 2011. Hinkebein did not write to the prison in which Robinson
was incarcerated to arrange telephone calls with Robinson until March 10,
March 11, and March 14, 2011 – the earliest attempt at communication with
Robinson was made just three days before the Rule 29.15 motion was due on
March 13. 35 These three instances were the only attempts Hinkebein made to
contact Robinson. 36
Hinkebein stopped communicating with Robinson entirely after March
2011. 37 “At the time the amended Rule 29.15 motion was due, [Hinkebein]
had not yet decided [whether he would file the motion] or a statement in lieu
of an amended motion.” 38 Ultimately, Hinkebein never filed an amended
motion or a statement in lieu of an amended motion. 39 Robinson was reassigned to a different public defender, and a trial court subsequently found
that Hinkebein had abandoned Robinson in his post-conviction relief action. 40
Christopher Hines was another client to whom Hinkebein was assigned
as counsel, and he is also one of the six subjects of the instant case. 41
Hinkebein entered his appearance as Hines’ counsel on or about December
32. Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 4-1.4.
33. Informant’s Brief, supra note 21, at 10.
34. Id. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 provides a procedure by which per-

sons convicted of a felony may challenge the conviction on the basis
that the conviction or sentence imposed violates the constitution and laws of
this state or the constitution of the United States, including claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, that the court imposing the sentence was without jurisdiction to do so, or that the sentence imposed was in
excess of the maximum sentence authorized by law.

MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(a).
35. Informant’s Brief, supra note 21, at 10.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 11–12.
41. Id. at 12.
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21, 2012. 42 Again, Hinkebein filed a motion for extension of time and was
granted until March 5, 2013, to file an amended Rule 29.15 motion. 43
Hinkebein did not attempt to arrange telephone calls with Hines in prison
until March 4, March 5, and March 6, 2013. 44 Hinkebein spoke with Hines
about his case for the first time on March 4 – one day before the amended
motion was due. 45 Hinkebein stopped communicating with Hines from
March 2013 until August 15, 2013. 46
Hinkebein communicated with Hines on or about August 15, 2013, but
only after Hines complained to Hinkebein’s supervisor that he had not heard
from Hinkebein. 47 Hinkebein never filed the amended motion or a statement
in lieu of an amended motion. 48 A trial court later found Hinkebein had
abandoned Hines in his post-conviction relief action. 49
William Williams is also a subject of the instant case. 50 Hinkebein entered his appearance as Williams’ counsel on or about September 9, 2013. 51
Hinkebein was granted an extension of time to file an amended Rule 29.15
motion until November 10, 2013. 52 Hinkebein’s caseload timeline shows the
earliest entry regarding work on Williams’ case was November 19, 2013, –
more than a week after the amended motion was due. 53 Hinkebein first
spoke with Williams on November 21, 2013, – eleven days after the amended
motion was due. 54 Hinkebein did not speak with Williams after November
21 and failed to speak with five of the six witnesses Williams identified during the November 21 conversation. 55 A trial court later found Hinkebein had
abandoned Williams in his post-conviction relief action. 56
Hinkebein was also found to have abandoned Dustin Watson, Allen
Giles, and Jeremy Arata under similar circumstances wherein Hinkebein
failed to communicate with the aforementioned and failed to file the appropriate motions in their post-conviction relief actions, even after receiving
extensions of time in each instance. 57 Hinkebein had been admonished on
three previous occasions by OCDC for the same violations he was accused of

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 16–23.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/12

6

Payne: Plight of the Public Defender: Excessive Caseload as a Non-Mitiga

2018]

PLIGHT OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER

1093

in the instant case: lack of diligence and failure to reasonably communicate
with clients. 58
In May of 2015, a disciplinary hearing panel was appointed to hear
Hinkebein’s case. 59 The hearing was held on July 26, 2016, in Jefferson City,
Missouri. 60 The panel issued its decision on October 31, 2016, concluding
Hinkebein violated Missouri Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4. 61 The panel recommended that Hinkebein “be placed on probation for one (1) year with conditions
that he not violate the Missouri Rules . . . and that he report to the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, or his designee, every ninety (90) days.” 62 The Supreme
Court of Missouri, through its Order of February 28, 2017, ordered the case
briefed and argued. 63
While Hinkebein freely admitted his violation of the Missouri Rules, he
argued they were “primarily attributable to his severe health problems and
excessive caseload.” 64 Hinkebein argued these factors were “outside [his]
control” and he had “no viable options related to his workload.” 65
Hinkebein called his health issues a “significant factor” in his inability
to timely file motions in all six cases. 66 Hinkebein’s medical records are
sealed, and therefore details of his health problems are not publicly known,
but according to Hinkebein’s brief, his serious health issues – which began in
2004 – “became critical in 2010.” 67 Hinkebein felt he was not functioning
normally at a “reasonable [physical] level” until 2014. 68 According to
Hinkebein’s brief, unless he was “fairly critically ill or in the hospital,”
Hinkebein was working approximately fifty hours per week despite his health
problems. 69 Even when hospitalized, Hinkebein worked on cases when he
could. 70
Hinkebein argued that, in addition to his health issues, his excessive
caseload was a factor in his inability to conform his conduct to the Missouri
Rules. 71 Hinkebein asserted he did not have the option to reject case assignments unless it created a conflict of interest. 72 Further, he asserted his supe58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Respondent’s Brief at 8, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo.
Sept. 12, 2017), 2017 WL 3195811, at *8.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 10 (“Respondent does not have the option to reject assignments, unless
he has a conflict of interest.”). Despite Hinkebein’s assertion, it should be noted that,
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rior “really would not have had any options” even if Hinkebein had informed
him that he was missing deadlines. 73 Hinkebein believed that “[i]ndividual
public defenders [were] trapped” – that despite large caseloads, rejecting an
assignment would result in being fired. 74 At the time of Hinkebein’s disciplinary hearing in July, his caseload was “approximately 110, which was higher
than anyone else in his office.” 75 Hinkebein “work[ed] more hours than any
other attorney in [his] office,” and his supervisor testified, “[Hinkebein] is
dedicated and has a very good work ethic.” 76
Two questions were presented for the Supreme Court of Missouri:
whether Hinkebein violated any Missouri Rules, and if so, “what discipline, if
any, was appropriate for those violations.” 77 The Supreme Court of Missouri
found that Hinkebein violated Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) and that he should be
disciplined. The Court suspended Hinkebein’s license indefinitely but stayed
the suspension, placing Hinkebein on probation for one year. 78

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Section A of this Part gives a brief history of MSPD. Section B of this
Part details MSPD’s widespread and continuous problems with funding and
excessive caseloads. Section C then briefly explores pertinent Missouri
Rules, while Section D details how those rules apply to public defenders in
Missouri. Section E then discusses the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer
Sanctions, including recognized aggravating and mitigating factors.

A. Brief History of MSPD
MSPD provides legal assistance to indigent defendants in Missouri who
have been convicted or accused of crimes. 79 The State of Missouri relies
almost exclusively on MSPD to provide indigent defense services throughout
the state, with MSPD providing representation in over 100,000 cases a year. 80
according to the Missouri Rules, excessive caseload can create a conflict of interest.
Rule 4-1.7 states that a conflict of interest exists if “there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.7(2).
73. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 64, at 10.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 12.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Case
Summaries
for
September
7,
2017,
MO.
CTS.,
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=115187 (last visited Oct. 14, 2018).
78. Hinkebein Order, supra note 20.
79. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d, 913
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019); see also MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER,
https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-mspd/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
80. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997. This figure includes “new cases and cases
carried over from previous years.” Id.
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MSPD has three separate divisions: the Trial Division, the Appellate/PCR
Division, and the Capital Division. 81 MSPD employs almost 380 attorneys,
with most working in the Trial Division. 82
After the United States Supreme Court’s 1963 decision in Gideon affirmed that states have an obligation under the Sixth Amendment to provide
indigent clients with representation, 83 courts in Missouri appointed – but did
not compensate – private attorneys to represent indigent defendants in Missouri. 84 In September 1971, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that after
September 1972 it would no longer “compel the attorneys of Missouri to discharge alone ‘a duty which constitutionally is the burden of the State.’” 85
The one-year window provided by the court was intended to give the Missouri General Assembly an opportunity to provide a permanent solution to the
problem. 86
A “blended system of local public defender offices and appointed counsel programs” 87 was utilized beginning in 1972 when the Missouri General
Assembly passed chapter 600 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri (“RSMo”),
which established the Public Defender Commission 88 and secured paid counsel for indigent defendants through “a system of full-time public defenders.” 89 By 1973, fourteen MSPD offices were present in Missouri, and that
number grew to eighteen by 1977. 90 However, by 1981, less than ten years
after its inception, MSPD was already in difficult financial straits, running out
of appropriated funds before the end of each fiscal year. 91 When called upon
to right the state’s wrongs – that is, its inability to pay its public defenders –
the Supreme Court of Missouri concluded it did not have the power to compel
the state to pay its attorneys but it did have the power to compel members of

81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id. “[R]oughly 313” public defenders work in the Trial Division. Id.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963).
State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
85. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971).
86. Id.
87. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 875.
88. The purpose of the Public Defender Commission was to appoint full-time
public defenders to four-year terms and oversee MSPD. Our Distinguished History,
MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/about-mspd/history-of-mspd/
(last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
89. ABA, EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN THE STATE DEATH
PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE MISSOURI DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 168 (2012)
[hereinafter ABA, DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/death_penalty_moratori
um/final_missouri_assessment_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
90. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88.
91. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 876.
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The Missouri Bar to represent indigent defendants. 92 The court directed attorneys to “represent indigent defendants until the legislature chose to fix the
lack of funding.” 93
In 1982, House Bill 1169 (“HB1169”) overhauled the public defender
system and created the Office of State Public Defender (“OSPD”). 94 HB1169
gave OSPD the authority to issue guidelines for indigence determination,
outlined the legal services to be provided for qualified defendants entitled to
counsel, authorized the appointment of private counsel in indigent defense
cases for a set contract fee, and provided for the collection of costs relating to
the representation of indigent clients. 95
In 1987, fifteen years after chapter 600 was enacted, twenty-three public
defender offices existed in Missouri. 96 Portions of the state not served by the
existing public defender offices were served through state contracts with private attorneys. 97 According to MSPD’s website, MSPD was handling approximately 41,000 cases annually in the years around 1987. 98
In 1989, MSPD underwent another major overhaul in response to the
rising cost of the contract counsel program and the increasing unwillingness
of private attorneys “to take on indigent cases for the fees paid by . . .
[MSPD].” 99 Funding provided in 1989 allowed for the reorganization of the
system into three distinct legal services divisions: (1) the Trial Division, (2)
the Appellate/PCR Division, and (3) the Capital Division. 100 This is the organization of MSPD that still exists as of the writing of this Note.101
Currently, MSPD has “[thirty-three] district offices, [six] appellate sections, and [three] capital sections.” 102 MSPD has continued to struggle with
underfunding and excessive caseloads. In 2017, a Boone County judge appointed thirty-seven private attorneys to represent indigent clients due to

92. Id. (“In State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, the Court was asked to compel the state
to pay attorneys for their work. 617 S.W.2d 64, 64 (Mo. banc 1981). At that time,
this Court said that it did not have the power to do so but that it did have the power to
turn to The Missouri Bar and compel lawyers to represent indigent defendants.”).
93. Id. (citing Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d at 67).
94. H.R. 1169, 81st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 1982) (codified as
amended at MO. REV. STAT. § 600.019 (2016)); see also Our Distinguished History,
supra note 88. OSPD was created to be an independent arm of the state’s judicial
branch. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88.
95. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876
(Mo. 2009) (en banc); see also ABA, DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS, supra note 89, at
169.
100. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88.
101. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 876; see Our Distinguished History, supra note 88.
102. Our Distinguished History, supra note 88.
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MSPD’s excessive caseload and inability to take on more cases at the time. 103
In addition, Texas County has been completely privatized, meaning indigent
defense is wholly provided by private attorneys who contract with MSPD. 104
These and MSPD’s other proliferative problems are explored further in Section B below.

B. A System in Crisis: Overworked and Underfunded
MSPD has been the subject of increasingly sharp criticism in recent
years, but intense concern has been present for decades. MSPD has been
independently evaluated on ten occasions since 1989. 105 Lack of funding and
excessive caseloads have been a concern in nearly all of these evaluations. 106

1. Funding
The Missouri General Assembly provides funding for MSPD via annual
appropriations that are subject to the approval of the Missouri governor. 107
Funds are almost exclusively pulled from Missouri’s general revenue. 108 For
fiscal year 2018, funding for MSPD constituted less than one-half of one percent of Missouri’s general revenue. 109

103. Caitlin Campbell, Boone County Court Appoints 37 Private Attorneys to
Indigent Clients, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Oct. 4, 2017),
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20171004/boone-county-court-appoints-37private-attorneys-to-indigent-clients.
104. Sky Chadde, Some Missouri Lawmakers Want to Privatize the Public Defender System. For One County, It Starts March 1., ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb.
20, 2018), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/some-missourilawmakers-want-to-privatize-the-public-defender-system/article_162ed0cc-049052d9-b623-40a4b82b19e5.html.
105. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 997 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d, 913
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019). Assessments have been conducted by The Spangenberg
Group in 1993 and 2005; the Missouri Senate Interim Committee in 2006; The Spangenberg Group and the Center for Law, Justice, and Society at George Mason University in 2009; the U.S. Department of Justice – Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2010; the
American Bar Association in 2010; the National Juvenile Defender Center in 2013;
the American Bar Association and RubinBrown in 2014; the U.S. Department of
Justice in 2015; and the Sixth Amendment Center in 2016. Id.
106. See State ex rel. Missouri Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 876
(Mo. 2009) (en banc). Over the years, felony prosecutions tripled, but funding for
MSPD has not increased commensurately. Id.
107. ABA, DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS, supra note 89, at 168.
108. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
109. Id.; see also MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2018
ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2018), https://publicdefender.mo.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/MSPD-2018-Annual-Report.pdf [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR
2018 ANNUAL REPORT].
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As of 2017, “Missouri [ranked] [forty-ninth] among the [fifty] states in
funding for indigent defense.” 110 A 2016 study by the Sixth Amendment
Center determined “Missouri’s per capita spending on indigent defense is
approximately one-third of the average of the [thirty-five] states surveyed.” 111
The Sixth Amendment Center found Missouri spent $6.20 per resident on
indigent defense in fiscal year 2015 as compared to an average of $18.41 for
the other thirty-five states surveyed. 112 Reports by the National Juvenile Defender Center and the ABA called Missouri’s funding for public defense
“woefully inadequate to guarantee the constitutional rights of indigent[] defendants . . . .” 113
Even those working within MSPD have expressed concern that MSPD
is violating its constitutional duties to indigent Missourians. 114 In August
2015, the Director of MSPD, Michael Barrett, wrote to then-Governor Jay
Nixon and requested additional funds for MSPD, warning, “[T]he rights of
poor Missourians are being violated throughout the state because MSPD’s
resources are too few and the caseloads are too high.” 115 Barrett requested
$10 million in supplemental funds, but Governor Nixon denied this request. 116 At the time of this request, numerous studies showed that MSPD’s
inadequate funding was a threat to the constitutional rights of indigent defendants in Missouri. 117
The Missouri Legislature attempted to provide reprieve for MSPD in
fiscal year 2015, approving an extra $3.4 million in funding. 118 However,
then-Governor Nixon vetoed the funding. 119 Even after the legislature overrode his veto, Nixon withheld the funds from MSPD. 120 For fiscal year 2017,
the legislature again attempted to provide additional funding to MSPD, approving $4.5 million in additional funds. 121 Nixon again thwarted that effort,
directing that MSPD receive only $1 million. 122 In response to Nixon’s withholding, Barrett and the Public Defender Commission filed a lawsuit in the
Circuit Court of Cole County, arguing the decision to withhold funds from
MSPD violated the Missouri Constitution. 123 Barrett stated in a press release
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
Id. (reporting on the Sixth Amendment Center study’s finding).
Id.
Id. at 997–98.
See id. at 998.
Id. at 997.
Id. at 997–98.
See assessments listed supra note 104.
Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Bob Watson, Missouri Public Defender System Sues over Funding Cuts,
FULTON SUN (July 6, 2016),
http://www.fultonsun.com/news/missouri/story/2016/jul/06/missouri-public-defender-
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regarding the lawsuit that “[t]hroughout his two terms in office, Gov[ernor]
Nixon has seldom passed on an opportunity to weaken a poor person’s constitutional right to counsel.” 124 Cole County Circuit Judge Jon Beetem dismissed the lawsuit, holding Nixon had the legal authority to withhold the
funds. 125
Many may remember when Barrett – frustrated with Nixon’s repeated
refusal to approve funding for MSPD – assigned Nixon to a case under a state
law provision that allows the Director of MSPD, in extraordinary circumstances, to “delegate” legal representation to any member of the state bar of
Missouri. 126 In looking to assign cases to attorneys outside of MSPD, Barrett
stated that he would start with “the one attorney in the state who not only
created [the] problem, but is in a unique position to address it.” 127 Nixon
ultimately did not have to obey Barrett’s appointment of him to a criminal
case (the power to appoint attorneys to criminal cases rests with courts
alone), 128 but a message was sent nonetheless.
In 2017, Barrett stated, “If you go back three years, $6 million has been
left on the table for [MSPD].” 129 In fiscal year 2017, 17.99% of MSPD attor-

system-sues-over-funding-cuts/631465/. See generally Barrett v. Nixon, No. 16ACCC00290, 2016 WL 8970077 (Mo. Cir. Ct. 2016).
124. Public Defender Files Legal Challenge to Governor’s Withhold Actions, MO.
ST. PUB. DEFENDER (July 13, 2016), https://publicdefender.mo.gov/publicinformation/mspd-in-the-news/pdfileslegalchallenge/; see also Watson, supra note
123.
125. Barrett, 2016 WL 8970077, at *2; see also Bob Watson, Public Defenders’
Budget in Limbo, NEWS TRIB. (June 10, 2017),
http://www.newstribune.com/news/local/story/2017/jun/10/public-defenders-budgetlimbo/677489/.
126. Letter from Michael Barrett, Dir. of Mo. Pub. Def. Sys., to Jay Nixon, Governor of Mo. (Aug. 2, 2016),
https://bloximages.newyork1.vip.townnews.com/stltoday.com/content/tncms/assets/v
3/editorial/c/ff/cff01561-2e8e-5d40-99bd-d016eab58a13/57a2ace631005.pdf.pdf.
[hereinafter Letter from Michael Barrett to Jay Nixon]. Barrett was invoking his
power under MO. REV. STAT. § 600.042.5 (2016) (giving the Director of MSPD the
authority to “[d]elegate the legal representation of an eligible person to any member
of the state bar of Missouri”). Ultimately, a Cole County Circuit Court judge ruled
that the authority vested in the Director of MSPD under section 600.042.5 does not
include the ability to appoint Nixon or any other private attorney, to a case – only
courts can do that. See Celeste Bott, Court Rules Public Defender Can’t Appoint
Missouri Governor as a Defense Attorney, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 25,
2016), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/court-rules-publicdefender-can-t-appoint-missouri-governor-as/article_c59059f8-98c8-50fe-906812a9b092b7f3.html.
127. Letter from Michael Barrett to Jay Nixon, supra note 126.
128. Bott, supra note 126.
129. Watson, supra note 125. Barrett noted that then-Governor Greitens continued the withholding of $3.5 million in appropriations initiated by Governor Nixon.
Id.
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neys left MSPD. 130 MSPD stated, “A significant contributing factor to turnover is the salaries MSPD is able to pay [assistant public defenders]. 131 For
fiscal year 2018, a budget committee was willing to grant MSPD a $6.8 million funding increase, but then-Governor Eric Greitens approved an increase
of only $1 million. 132 However, in its Fiscal Year 2018 Report, MSPD noted
a $3.5 million core restoration in addition to the aforementioned $1 million
increase, which resulted in a net $4.5 million increase in available general
revenue funds. 133 There were no withholdings in fiscal year 2018. 134 For
fiscal year 2019, MSPD was appropriated funds to increase the salaries of
public defenders. 135

2. Excessive Caseload Burden
In 2009, a report by The Spangenberg Group and the Center for Justice,
Law and Society at George Mason University concluded that MSPD’s caseload burden was “a crisis so serious it has pushed the entire criminal justice
system in Missouri to the brink of collapse.” 136 Resources – including staff –
have been a concern for MSPD since 1993 when The Spangenberg Group
concluded that MSPD “lack[ed] the necessary resources to provide competent
representation” and that “[t]he legal staff need[ed] to be increased as soon as
possible.” 137
Concerns had not dissipated more than ten years later in 2005 when the
Missouri Bar Association created a Public Defender Taskforce (“Taskforce”)
to assist the Public Defender Commission in addressing the deficiencies of
MSPD. 138 The Taskforce commissioned The Spangenberg Group to conduct
another study on MSPD in 2005. 139 The Spangenberg Group again found the
130. MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER SYSTEM BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 18 (2017),
https://oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/FY_2019_Public_%20Defender_Budget_Request
.pdf [hereinafter BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL YEAR 2019].
131. Id.
132. Marshall Griffin, A Look at How Missouri Will Spend $27.8 Billion, Should
Gov. Greitens Approve, KCUR89.3 (May 7, 2017), http://kcur.org/post/look-howmissouri-will-spend-278-billion-should-gov-greitens-approve#stream/0.
133. FISCAL YEAR 2018 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 109.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG, DAVID J. NEWHOUSE & JON B. GOULD,
ASSESSMENT OF THE MISSOURI STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM: A FINAL REPORT 64
(2009),
http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/2009%20Assessment%20of%20the%20Misso
uri%20State%20Public%20Defender%20System%20(TSG).pdf.
137. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 998 (W.D. Mo. 2017) (first two
alterations in original), rev’d, 913 F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019).
138. Id.
139. See id.
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operations of MSPD troubling, concluding that hardworking public defenders
were routinely failing to comply with MSPD Guidelines 140 and the Missouri
Rules due to excessive caseloads. 141 A 2006 Missouri Senate report found
that from 2000 to 2006, MSPD’s caseload increased by more than 12,000
cases, but there had been no proportional additions made to its staff. 142
MSPD’s caseload crisis has continued to grow. 143
The Missouri Bar Association retained The Spangenberg Group again in
2009 to conduct yet another report on MSPD. The report, summarized here
by District Court Judge Nanette K. Laughrey, found that
public defender workloads had worsened since its 2005 report and, as
a result of those workloads, public defenders were failing to (1) conduct prompt interviews of their clients following arrest, (2) spend sufficient time interviewing and counseling their clients, (3) advocate effectively for pretrial release, (4) conduct thorough investigations of
their cases, (5) pursue formal and informal discovery, (6) file appropriate and essential pleadings and motions, (7) conduct necessary legal
research, and (8) prepare adequately for pretrial hearings, trial, and
sentencing. 144

Concerned with MSPD’s increasingly complex and outsized caseload
and the lack of an increase in public defenders to go with it, the Public Defender Commission enacted a “caseload protocol” regulation, which took
effect in 2008. 145 The protocol allowed “a district defender office to decline
additional appointments when it has been certified as being on limited availability after exceeding its caseload capacity for at least three consecutive calendar months.” 146 In 2012, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the validity of this protocol. 147 Nonetheless, MSPD offices that attempted to turn away
cases triggered “resistance from prosecutors, judges, and legislators.” 148

140. “MSPD Guidelines for Representation [were] adopted by the Missouri State
Public Defender Commission [and] set out the Commission’s expectations of its attorneys in order to meet the [ethical and constitutional] standards for effective representation of clients served by Missouri Public Defenders.” BUDGET REQUEST FISCAL
YEAR 2019, supra note 130, at 3.
141. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
142. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 877 (Mo.
2009) (en banc).
143. Id.
144. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 998.
145. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 599, 599
n.4 (Mo. 2012) (en banc).
146. Id. at 597.
147. See id. at 612. However, subsections of the rule as originally promulgated
have been held invalid by the Supreme Court of Missouri. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d at 890
(rejecting a public defender office may decline to take on any new appointments until
the caseload falls below the commission’s standard, but “allowing a public defender
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Legislators even threatened to privatize the entire system if MSPD continued to turn away cases. 149 The legislature did not make good on its threat,
but it nonetheless crippled MSPD’s efforts to limit its excessive caseload. In
2013, the legislature passed section 600.062, RSMo, which explicitly denied
the Director of MSPD and the Public Defender Commission “the authority to
limit the availability of a district office or [any MSPD public defender] to
accept cases based on a determination that the office has exceeded a caseload
standard.” 150 Section 600.062 dictated that unless a court provided prior approval, MSPD could not refuse to provide representation to indigent defendants. 151 Until 2017, MSPD had not refused to take on cases “in any consistent or systematic way” since the passage of section 600.062. 152
A 2014 report once again highlighted MSPD’s deficiencies. The ABA
and RubinBrown, an accounting firm, tasked researchers with calculating the
minimum number of hours an appointed counsel would need to devote to
various kinds of cases in order to meet constitutionally permissible standards
of representation. 153 MSPD data from 2013 was then used to determine
whether these standards were being met. 154 On average, no single category of
case met the minimum standards calculated by the ABA and RubinBrown. 155
The following table displays the troubling results of the study. 156

office to decline categories of cases is contrary to [section 600.042.4(3)] and is invalid.”).
148. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999. “In some circuits, cases that were turned
away were assigned to non-MSPD attorneys with no criminal defense experience who
were not compensated for their time.” Id.
149. Id.
150. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.062 (2016).
151. Id.
152. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999. In October 2017, MSPD’s District 13
stopped accepting new cases and created a “wait list.” See infra notes 254–70 and
accompanying text. As of the writing of this Note, the District is still utilizing the
wait list system and has not yet begun to accept new cases. See infra notes 254–70
and accompanying text.
153. Id. See generally RUBINBROWN, THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE
MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS
(2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
154. RUBINBROWN, supra note 153, at 15.
155. See id.; see also Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
156. See RUBINBROWN, supra note 153, at 6, 16; see also Church, 268 F. Supp.
3d at 999.
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Table 1. Hours Needed and Spent by Type of Case157
Type of Case
Min. to Meet
Constitutional
Obligations
Time Spent by
MSPD Public
Defenders in
2013
Difference

Non-Capital
Murder or
Homicide

A/B
Felony

C/D
Felony

Felony
Sex
Offense

Misdemeanor

Probation
Violation

106.6 hours

47.6
hours

25
hours

63.8
hours

11.7 hours

9.8 hours

84.5 hours

8.7
hours

4.4
hours

25.6
hours

2.3 hours

1.4 hours

22.1

38.9

20.6

38.2

9.4

8.4

The study results showed that, throughout the state, MSPD offices were
functioning far beyond their workload capacity. In the Trial Division, public
defenders “were able to devote the minimum required hours to only 2.4% of
all A/B Felony cases (or 97 out of 4,127 total A/B felony cases) and 1.4% of
C/D felony cases (or 311 out of 21,491 total C/D felony cases).” 158
These numbers reflect that, in one year alone, thousands of indigent defendants in Missouri were appointed attorneys who could not devote enough
time to their cases to meet constitutional standards of representation. In addition to a constitutional crisis, MSPD has acknowledged its attorneys are violating its own MSPD Guidelines for Representation. 159 In its budget request
for fiscal year 2019, MSPD stated that “[case] overload has forced lawyers
and investigators alike to cut corners, skip steps, and make on-the-fly triage
decisions in order to keep up with the deluge of cases coming in the door. As
a result, effectiveness in many of these cases is seriously compromised.” 160
For fiscal year 2019, the General Assembly granted MSPD $49,613,083 – a
roughly $4 million increase over fiscal year 2018 but still far below the
$75,392,296 MSPD requested in order to provide constitutionally adequate
representation. 161

157. The information in this table is generated from the results of the 2014 RubinBrown report. RUBINBROWN, supra note 153, at 6. All data from the minimum
constitutional obligations row can be found at id., while all the data in the time spent
by MSPD row can be found at id. at 16.
158. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 999.
159. Id. at 998.
160. Id.
161. Lack of Adequate Funding Forces Missouri Public Defenders to Shortchange
Constitutional Rights, ACLU (May 17, 2018), https://www.aclumo.org/en/news/lack-adequate-funding-forces-missouri-public-defendersshortchange-constitutional-rights; see also, MO. OFFICE OF ADMIN., FISCAL YEAR 19
APPROPRIATION BILL BY DEPARTMENT 4 (2019),
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In 2017, a class action lawsuit was filed against the State of Missouri
and then-Governor of Missouri Eric Greitens, alleging Missouri had “failed to
meet its constitutional obligation to provide indigent defendants with meaningful representation.” 162 Five plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of themselves
and for all indigent persons who were at the time, or would be during the
pendency of the litigation, subject to formal charges that carried penalties of
imprisonment, confinement, detention, or incarceration in a Missouri state
court and who were eligible to be represented by MSPD. 163 Following the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri’s denial, in part, of
Missouri’s and Greitens’ motions to dismiss, the case was appealed to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 164 The Eighth Circuit heard
oral arguments on April 10, 2018. 165 On January 10, 2019, the Eighth Circuit
issued its opinion, reversing the district court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and remanding to the district court for further proceedings. 166 The
Eighth Circuit’s opinion exemplifies the difficulty that inheres in seeking
systemic reform through lawsuits that name the state itself or the state’s governor as a defendant – absent special circumstances, both are virtually always
shielded from suit through various immunity doctrines. 167
https://oa.mo.gov/sites/default/files/FY%202019%20Totals%20by%20Department.pd
f.
162. Church, 268 F. Supp. 3d at 997.
163. Id. at 1003–08.
164. Id. at 1023; Dennis Crouch, A Few Eighth Circuit Cases, PATENTLY-O (Apr.
9, 2018), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2018/04/eighth-circuit-cases.html (“The appeal
by the State argues for immunity. In particular, the Government argues that: (a) the
Eleventh Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity bar Plaintiffs’ claims
against the State of Missouri; (b) Plaintiffs’ claims against Missouri’s Governor do
not fall within the Ex parte Young exception to sovereign immunity; and (c) . . . absolute legislative immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against the Governor.”).
165. See Case Number 17-2857: Shondel Church v. State of Missouri, EIGHTH
CIR. CT. OF APPEALS, http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/genrlSrch.pl?pa_type=cs
(search 17-2857 in case number box and click submit. On the next page click the
“play” hyperlink next to “Oral Argument 04/10/2018.”) (last visited Dec. 28, 2018).
166. Church v. Missouri, 913 F.3d 736, 754 (8th Cir. 2019) (finding Missouri’s
general sovereign immunity foreclosed suit against the State absent its consent, including Plaintiffs suit seeking prospective equitable relief; Governor’s actions were
not basis for an Ex parte Young action and therefore he was entitled to sovereign
immunity; and Governor’s authority to withhold appropriations was a legislative act
which conferred upon him legislative immunity even if sovereign immunity did not
apply).
167. State officials are not entitled to sovereign immunity and are not shielded
from official-capacity suits seeking injunctive relief when government officials attempt to enforce an unconstitutional law. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In
addition, states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity when they remove an
action from state to federal court. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga.,
535 U.S. 613, 624 (2002). However, removing an action from state to federal court
does not waive a state’s general sovereign immunity. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706, 713 (1999) (“[S]overeign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is
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C. Missouri Rules of Professional Conduct: MSPD Attorneys’ Continuing Violations
The Missouri Rules require attorneys to hold themselves to certain
standards of conduct. 168 The purpose of the Missouri Rules and any attorney
discipline that may flow from their violation is to “protect the public and the
administration of justice.” 169
The Missouri Rules relating to diligence and communication are particularly relevant to attorneys who are facing excessive caseloads. Rule 4-1.3
mandates that “[a] lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client.” 170 Rule 4-1.4 dictates that:
(a) A lawyer shall:
(1) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;
(2) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information;
and
(3) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the
lawyer’s conduct when the lawyer knows the client expects assistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct or
other law.
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary
to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 171

Despite the individual obligations of each lawyer under the Missouri
Rules, MSPD’s excessive caseload prevents public defenders from meeting
regularly with their clients and often results in meeting meaningfully with a
client for the first time only weeks before the start of the client’s trial. 172
Moreover, time constraints and heavy caseloads prevent proper investigation of clients’ cases and prevent adequate preparation for trial and plea
negotiations. 173 Most public defenders do not have adequate time to review
and analyze discovery early enough in a case to make meaningful decisions

limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment.”); Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State
Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 753 (2002) (“[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the
States extends beyond the literal text of the Eleventh Amendment.”).
168. See generally MO. SUP. CT. R. 4.
169. See Missouri Attorney Discipline System, MO. OFF. OF CHIEF DISCIPLINARY
COUNSEL, https://www.mochiefcounsel.org/.
170. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.3.
171. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4-1.4.
172. Church v. Missouri, 268 F. Supp. 3d 992, 1001 (W.D. Mo. 2017), rev’d, 913
F.3d 736 (8th Cir. 2019).
173. Id.
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regarding whom to depose and when further investigation is necessary. 174
Depositions are taken in only a “small fraction” of cases, leaving potentially
crucial information outside of the public defender’s knowledge. 175 In short,
public defenders in MSPD are routinely violating their ethical obligations
under the Missouri Rules.

D. The ABA and the Supreme Court of Missouri: “No Exception for
Public Defenders”
In 2006, the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 06-411 (“Formal Opinion”) 176 – its “first
ever ethics opinion concerning the obligations of lawyers, burdened with
excessive caseloads, who provide indigent defense representation.” 177 ABA
ethics opinions must be based on the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct
(“ABA Rules”), and thus, there was “never any real doubt” about what the
Formal Opinion would say regarding professional obligations in the midst of
excessive caseloads. 178 The Formal Opinion unequivocally stated that there
are “no exceptions” for public defenders; 179 “all lawyers have a duty to furnish competent and diligent [representation].” 180
Further, the Formal Opinion held that when an excessive caseload or
soon-to-be excessive caseload prevents competent and diligent representation,
new cases cannot be accepted, and the onus is on the lawyer to request that
new appointments be stopped. 181 If an attorney already has an excessive
caseload preventing competent and diligent representation, the attorney
should “move to withdraw from a sufficient number of cases” to bring their
representation into conformance with their ethical obligations once again. 182
The Supreme Court of Missouri has also weighed in on public defenders’ professional conduct responsibilities in the face of extreme caseloads,
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. ABA Comm’n on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-411 (2006),

https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defe
ndants/ls_sclaid_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter Formal Opinion].
177. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFS., EIGHT
GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS 1 (2009),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defe
ndants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Eight Guidelines]. See generally Formal Opinion, supra note 176.
178. NORMAN LEFSTEIN, ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND LAW IN
PUBLIC DEFENSE 32 (2011).
179. Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 3.
180. Eight Guidelines, supra note 177, at 1.
181. Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 4–5.
182. Id. at 9.
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echoing the ABA’s conclusion in the Formal Opinion. In Missouri Public
Defender Commission v. Waters, the court held that “no exception exists to
the [Missouri Rules] for lawyers who represent indigent persons.” 183 Further,
the Supreme Court of Missouri held that “[c]ounsel violates [Rules 4-1.1, 41.3, and 4-1.4 when] she accepts a case that results in a caseload so high it
impairs her ability to provide competent representation, to act with reasonable
diligence, and to keep the client reasonably informed.” 184 Therefore, “public
defenders are risking their own professional lives” when they are appointed to
– and when they accept – an excessive number of cases. 185
Public defenders do not bear ethical obligations alone. Supervisors responsible for public defenders have ethical responsibilities when their subordinates are violating – or are about to violate – rules of professional conduct. 186 The Formal Opinion recognized the duty of supervisors in managerial positions in circumstances where subordinate lawyers face excessive caseloads. 187 Supervisors, and indeed even the top echelons of defender services,
are required to make “reasonable efforts” to ensure subordinate lawyers comply with applicable ethical rules. 188 Supervisors should monitor caseloads to
ensure lawyers can deliver competent and diligent representation. 189 When
supervisors are aware that a lawyer has an excessive caseload, supervisors
have a duty to take remedial action, and failure to do so makes supervisors
themselves responsible for the professional conduct violations of subordinate
lawyers. 190
Further, when a subordinate lawyer feels the resolution of a manager is
not reasonable with respect to remedial measures taken or not taken, the Formal Opinion commands the subordinate lawyer to continue up the chain of
command, “perhaps leading to the matter being brought to the head of the
defender program and even to the program’s governing board, if there is
one.” 191 In 2009, the ABA promulgated Eight Guidelines of Public Defense
Related to Excessive Workloads (“Eight Guidelines”), which advised public
defender programs, like MSPD, to employ “a supervision program that continuously monitors the workloads of its lawyers to assure that all essential
tasks . . . are performed” and reiterated the duties of those with “management
responsibilities.” 192

183. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 608 (Mo.
2012) (en banc).
184. Id. at 607.
185. Id. at 608 (quoting State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d
870, 880 (Mo. 2009) (en banc)).
186. See Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 8.
190. Id.
191. LEFSTEIN, supra note 178, at 32.
192. Eight Guidelines, supra note 177, at 2.
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E. The ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
In 1986, the ABA promulgated the ABA Standards in an attempt to
make lawyer discipline effective by establishing clear standards for sanctions. 193 The ABA Standards set forth a “comprehensive system of sanctions” designed to promote “thorough, rational consideration of all factors
relevant to imposing a sanction in an individual case.” 194 The ABA Standards seek to ensure that factors are given appropriate weight in light of the
purposes of lawyer discipline and that “only relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances are considered at the appropriate time.” 195 The Joint
Committee on Professional Sanctions (“Sanctions Committee”) – the committee responsible for promulgating the ABA Standards – “adopted a model
[for imposing sanctions] that looks first at the ethical duty and to whom it is
owed[] and then at the lawyer’s mental state and the amount of injury caused
by the lawyer’s misconduct.” 196
The model developed by the Sanctions Committee asks courts to answer
the following questions when imposing sanctions:
(1) What ethical duty did the lawyer violate [– a] duty to the client, the
public, the legal system, or the profession?[;] (2) What was the lawyer’s mental state [– d]id the lawyer act intentionally, knowingly, or
negligently?[;] (3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury
caused by the lawyer’s misconduct [– w]as there a serious or potentially serious injury?[;] and (4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances? 197

The ABA Standards assume the most important ethical duties are those
to the client, including: “the duty of loyalty,” the duty to preserve client property, the duty to “maintain client confidences,” the duty to “avoid conflicts of
interest,” “the duty of diligence,” “the duty of competence,” and “the duty of
candor.” 198 As for a lawyer’s mental state, the ABA Standards assert that
[t]he most culpable mental state is [that of] intent[ –] when the lawyer
acts with the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular
result. The [second] most culpable mental state is that of knowledge[
– ] when the lawyer acts with conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of his or her conduct [but] without the con193. ABA, STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 2 (1992) [hereinafter
STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS],
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibi
lity/sanction_standards.authcheckdam.pdf.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 3.
197. Id. at 4–5.
198. Id. at 5.
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scious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. The
least culpable mental state is negligence[ –] when a lawyer fails to be
aware of a substantial risk that circumstances exist or that a result will
follow, which failure is a deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable lawyer would exercise in the situation. 199

The extent of the injury is “defined by the type of duty violated and the
extent of actual or potential harm.” 200 There are various levels of injury in
the model – “serious injury,” “injury,” and “little or no injury.”
Under the ABA Standards, answers to the first three questions regarding
duty, mental state, and injury shape the baseline sanction that could be imposed. 201 After making an initial determination as to the appropriate sanction, aggravating and mitigating factors are then considered and may have the
effect of increasing or decreasing the appropriate sanction. 202
The Sanctions Committee outlined specific aggravating and mitigating
factors. “Aggravating factors include: (a) prior disciplinary offenses; (b)
dishonest or selfish motive; (c) a pattern of misconduct; (d) multiple offenses
. . .” and more. 203 “Mitigating factors include: (a) absence of a prior disciplinary record; (b) absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (c) personal or emotional problems; . . . (e) full and free disclosure to the disciplinary board; . . .
(f) inexperience in the practice of law; . . . (h) physical disability; . . .” and
more. 204 The existence of an excessive caseload is not a mitigating factor
articulated in the ABA Standards. 205

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 17. Other aggravating factors include:

(e) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing
to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency;
(f) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices
during the disciplinary process;
(g) refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
(h) vulnerability of victim;
(i) substantial experience in the practice of law;
(j) indifference to making restitution;
(k) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances.

Id.
204. Id. at 18. Other mitigating factors include:
(d) timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of
misconduct; . . .
(g) character or reputation; . . .
(i) mental disability or chemical dependency including alcoholism or drug
abuse when:
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
It was undisputed by both OCDC and Hinkebein that Hinkebein violated
Missouri Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a). 206 Therefore, the material question in the
instant case was the severity of the discipline to be imposed. 207 The Supreme
Court of Missouri heard oral arguments on the matter from Alan Pratzel,
Chief Disciplinary Counsel for OCDC, and Sara Rittman of Rittman Law
LLC, attorney for Hinkebein. Pratzel asked the court to “suspend
Hinkebein’s law license with no leave to apply for reinstatement for one
year.” 208 Hinkebein argued his professional conduct violations warranted
only a reprimand. 209

A. Argument
Pratzel argued the ABA Standards on which the court regularly relies
dictated a baseline sanction of suspension in the instant case. 210 According to
ABA Standard 4.42, a suspension is warranted if an attorney acts with a
knowing lack of diligence that causes injury or potential injury to a client. 211
ABA Standard 4.42 also dictates that suspension should be the baseline sanction when a lawyer “engages in a pattern of neglect and causes injury or po-

(1) there is medical evidence that the respondent is affected by a chemical
dependency or mental disability;
(2) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct;
(3) the respondent’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental
disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and
(4) the recovery arrested the misconduct and recurrence of that misconduct is unlikely.
(j) delay in disciplinary proceedings;
(k) imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
(l) remorse;
(m) remoteness of prior offenses.

Id.
205. See id.
206. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 64, at 7; see also Oral Argument at 00:30–46,

02:31–36, In re Karl William Hinkebein, No. SC96089 (Mo. Sept. 12, 2017),
https://www.courts.mo.gov/file.jsp?id=117413.
207. See Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 02:38–42.
208. Case Summaries for September 7, 2017, supra note 77.
209. Id.
210. See Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 02:43–53.
211. STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS, supra note 193, at 12 (“Suspension is generally
appropriate when: (a) a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and
causes injury or potential injury to a client, or (b) a lawyer engages in a pattern of
neglect [and] causes injury or potential injury to a client.”); see also Oral Argument,
supra note 206, at 02:53–03:03.
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tential injury to a client.” 212 Pratzel argued those criteria had been met in the
instant case in that “six of [Hinkebein’s] clients were deprived of necessary
and appropriate legal services due to [Hinkebein’s] neglect of their cases.” 213
Pratzel argued Hinkebein was “clearly knowing” in that he was “conscious[ly] aware[] of the nature and circumstances of [his] misconduct.” 214
Pratzel conceded that while there was arguably no injury in the instant
case because all six clients were able to eventually file Rule 29.15 motions 215
and none were meritorious, there was a potential for injury because had any
one of them been meritorious, relief for that client would have been delayed
and “placed in jeopardy by the fact [Hinkebein] neglected their [case].” 216
Pratzel described aggravators in the consideration of sanctions as the three
previous admonitions of Hinkebein – the “pattern of misconduct, [the fact]
there were multiple offenses, and [the fact that] the victims . . . were vulnerable.” 217
Pratzel acknowledged there were mitigating factors to be considered in
Hinkebein’s case, including that Hinkebein gave full and free disclosure,
Hinkebein was cooperative and remorseful, “and [Hinkebein] suffers from a
physical disability.” 218 However, Pratzel noted that five out of the six times
Hinkebein failed to file the required motions for his clients he had been out of
the hospital for months. 219 Moreover, Pratzel pointed out Hinkebein failed to
communicate with clients until the deadline for the required motions had
passed and hospitalization is not an adequate excuse for this sort of misconduct. 220
Pratzel took special effort to argue that excessive caseload should not be
a mitigating factor when considering the appropriate sanction. 221 Pratzel
noted that Hinkebein’s brief argued his excessive caseload was a factor in his
misconduct and further that Hinkebein’s brief cited studies that concluded
public defenders in MSPD have excessive caseloads that burden their ability
to provide diligent representation. 222 Pratzel stated the “apparent point” of
these arguments was to have “the court treat an excessive caseload as a mitigating factor, if not an outright defense[,] in this case and any case involving
a public defender who neglects client matters.” 223 When pushed by the court
to explain why he thought excessive caseload was not relevant to sanc212. STANDARDS FOR SANCTIONS, supra note 193, at 12; see also Oral Argument,
supra note 206, at 03:03–08.
213. See also Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 03:13–19.
214. Id. at 03:43–49.
215. See supra note 34.
216. Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 04:00–38.
217. Id. at 04:40–05:05.
218. Id. at 05:06–21.
219. Id. at 12:23–48.
220. Id. at 12:54–13:10.
221. See id. at 06:00–23.
222. See id. at 05:41–6:00.
223. Id. at 06:00–14.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 4 [2018], Art. 12

1112

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

tions, 224 Pratzel argued that the ABA Standards did not make excessive caseload a mitigating factor and further that allowing excessive caseload to mitigate sanctions would make for a “slippery slope.” 225
Pratzel opined that not only would such mitigation extend to all public
defenders engaged in misconduct but it might then possibly apply to any attorney with a heavy caseload, including private counsel and even prosecutors. 226 Pratzel emphasized to the court that any significant mitigation granted should be based on Hinkebein’s physical disability and should not be
based on the claim of excessive caseload. 227
On behalf of Hinkebein, Rittman argued Hinkebein was plagued by “severe and chronic physical health problems coupled with a broken public defender system.” 228 The court, however, was skeptical of the latter half of
Rittman’s argument and expressed that it saw no difference between public
defenders and young associates at big firms who are overburdened by the
work they are asked to perform. 229 Notably, one judge remarked, “I see a big
problem . . . if we allow attorneys to say my boss made me do it because
when they take the oath to follow the [Missouri] Rules . . . , sometimes that
means not taking a case, and sometimes that means taking a different job.” 230
In response to this statement, Rittman asked the court to consider what
benefit it would be to either the public or MSPD for a qualified, experienced,
and skilled lawyer to quit. 231 The court responded that Hinkebein could have
done much in between the two extremes of quitting and failing to represent
his clients, including letting a supervisor know the dire situation he was in. 232
Rittman replied that Hinkebein’s supervisor already knew of his situation and
reminded the court that the supervisor had in fact testified he would not have
been able to do anything about Hinkebein’s caseload, regardless of a complaint by Hinkebein. 233 The court then challenged: “Is that acceptable? To
not say anything because you think you’ll be rejected as opposed to trying [to
bring this to a supervisor for remedial measures]?” 234 The court further noted
that if the supervisor failed to act, the supervisor himself would face consequences for condoning ineffective assistance of counsel. 235

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 07:21–26.
Id. at 07:43–08:31.
Id. at 08:10–09:33.
Id. at 15:21–45.
Id. at 17:42–53.
Id. at 18:06 –19.
Id. at 18:35–55.
Id. at 19:13–39.
Id. at 19:43–20:23. “The fear that they might not like that and there might be
some retribution – I question if that’s reasonable – but that’s a long way from saying
‘I’ve just got to quit.’” Id. at 20:10–23.
233. Id. at 21:43–48.
234. Id. at 21:23–29.
235. Id. at 21:48–55.
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Rittman ultimately argued that excessive caseload should be considered
by the court in determining sanctions for Hinkebein but that the court should
also consider the “compelling” mitigating factor of Hinkebein’s physical
health and critical illness. 236 Rittman noted Hinkebein’s previous admonitions were seven years ago, 237 and the potential for harm in the cases at bar
was not great because abandonment routinely takes place, and courts routinely allow newly-appointed counsel to file amended motions out-of-time. 238
Rittman concluded by asserting that suspension would be “clearly excessive”
for Hinkebein in light of his health problems and his caseload. 239 In rebuttal,
Pratzel argued that if the court found Hinkebein’s health problems were such
that they sufficiently mitigated his misconduct to probation, the court should
impose a stayed suspension with probation, but in no case should it consider
excessive caseload or status as a public defender as a mitigating factor. 240

B. Decision
The Supreme Court of Missouri found Hinkebein violated Missouri
Rules 4-1.3 and 4-1.4(a) and that he should be disciplined. 241 After considering its previous decisions, the ABA Standards, as well as all aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, the court suspended Hinkebein’s license indefinitely but stayed the suspension and placed Hinkebein on probation for a period
of one year. 242 While the court wrote that it “consider[ed] . . . aggravating
and mitigating circumstances,” it made no mention of specific factors that
proved particularly influential to its decision to impose a stayed suspension
and probation. 243

V. COMMENT
The overburdened and underfunded MSPD is collapsing on itself.
While the indigent defendants who rely on this system are the persons we
should be first and foremost concerned about, public defenders are also in a
difficult position. Section A of this Part discusses the unlikelihood of excessive caseload becoming a mitigating factor in ethical violations for public
defenders. Section B of this Part highlights the inability of the ABA’s mandates to solve the pressing problems facing MSPD’s public defenders. Section C then turns to a discussion of the ramifications of Hinkebein. Section D

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id. at 25:35–26:36.
Id. at 26:37–27:05.
See id. at 30:01–49.
Id. at 31:09–32:30.
Id. at 33:10–30, 34:30–35:30.
Hinkebein Order, supra note 20.
Id.
See id.
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concludes this Part by briefly discussing potential solutions to MSPD’s crisis
– solutions that have proved elusive.

A. Excessive Caseloads Will Not Mitigate Ethical Violations of Missouri Public Defenders
One can speculate with reasonable confidence that the Supreme Court of
Missouri did not consider Karl Hinkebein’s excessive caseload to be a mitigating factor for his ethical violations. Not only do the ABA Standards fail to
enumerate excessive caseload as a mitigating factor, but there are also sound
reasons why such mitigation would prove problematic.
The Supreme Court of Missouri recognized the potential pitfalls of allowing excessive caseload to serve as a mitigating factor, with one judge explicitly agreeing with Chief Disciplinary Counsel Pratzel’s concern that such
mitigation would create a “slippery slope.” 244 Indeed, if one applied excessive caseload as a mitigating factor for public defenders, there does not seem
to be a compelling reason that excessive caseload would not be applied as a
mitigating factor to any lawyer who faced a heavy caseload. 245 The Supreme
Court of Missouri is unlikely to allow the Missouri Rules to be “diluted” in
such a way. 246 Attorneys should be incentivized to ensure they are handling
only the number of cases in which they can provide competent and diligent
representation. Allowing excessive caseload to mitigate ethical violations
would strip the ethical rules of their intent to regulate each individual lawyer’s conduct and allow lawyers to abdicate their important ethical responsibilities based on failures of the larger system in which they operate. While
systemic flaws should be addressed, indigent defendants the nation over
would be severely harmed if lawyers faced mere slaps on the wrist for serious
ethical violations.
Instead of a willingness to mitigate violations with excessive caseload
considerations, the Missouri Supreme Court seems to view public defenders
as having two choices when faced with overburdening workloads: (1) approach a supervisor and hope they can provide remedial measures or (2) if the
problem cannot be fixed, quit. 247 One judge’s remark bears repeating:
“[W]hen [attorneys] take the oath to follow the [Missouri] Rules . . . , sometimes that means not taking a case, and sometimes that means taking a different job.” 248

244. Oral Argument, supra note 206, at 33:51–34:02. “I understand your concern
about recognizing a mitigator of caseload – I share some of your concerns about that
being a slippery slope.” Id.
245. See id. at 08:10–09:33.
246. See id. at 34:30–35:40.
247. See id. at 18:35 –55. “I see a big problem . . . if we allow attorneys to say
my boss made me do it.” Id.
248. Id.
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B. The ABA’s Formal Opinion Is Not a Solution to MSPD’s Problem
The ABA’s Formal Opinion outlines the duties of a lawyer facing an
excessive caseload that hinder or prevent competent and diligent representation in a case. 249 When public defenders face an excessive caseload, they
should not take on more cases. 250 If appointed to new cases, they should file
a motion to withdraw, and if that motion is denied, they should appeal. 251
Moreover, public defenders should, if necessary, work their way up the chain
of command of their public defender system in the event of an excessive
caseload. 252 They should first notify and seek remedial measures from supervisors. 253 Supervisors then have a duty to make reasonable efforts to take
remedial measures in order to ensure a subordinate lawyer is not violating the
rules. 254
The majority of these mandates, though theoretically logical, cannot
alone lessen the excessive caseloads plaguing MSPD. In a system so afflicted
by lack of funding, lack of staff, and high turnover rates, a supervisor’s
knowledge of an attorney’s excessive caseload will have little effect. This is
because effective remedial measures are often unavailable. Hinkebein’s case
illustrates this point. An obvious remedial measure that a supervisor might
“reasonably” pursue involves attempting to reassign current (or divert new)
cases from an overworked attorney to a different, less burdened attorney. But
within MPSD, there simply are no lawyers with manageable caseloads who
can easily take on extra cases – everyone has an excessive caseload. 255 Thus,
supervisors often find their hands are tied as much as subordinate lawyers,
and there are a limited number of remedial measures other than case reassignment that can be “reasonably” pursued without adequate resources and
staff.
For the Formal Opinion’s suggestions and mandates to be effective,
MSPD must have at least some public defenders that are not already overburdened so that caseloads can be redistributed within MSPD when needed.
Moreover, individual public defenders need to be able to turn down cases
when necessary and – as recognized by the Eight Guidelines 256 – assign cases
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Formal Opinion, supra note 176, at 1–2.
Id. at 4–5.
See id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
Id.
See id.
See information supra Table 1.
Eight Guidelines, supra note 177, at 3. Guideline 5, in part, directs public
defender agencies like MSPD to avoid excessive caseloads by:
• Providing additional resources to assist the affected lawyers;
• Curtailing new case assignments to the affected lawyers;
• Reassigning cases to different lawyers within the defense program, with
court approval, if necessary;
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to private attorneys when necessary. In the absence of sweeping and meaningful reform that unburdens the system, some MSPD offices have chosen to
temporarily turn down new cases altogether. 257

C. No Representation, No Sanctions
In October 2017, David Wallis, one of the District Defenders of District
13 for MSPD, wrote a letter to local courts stating, “[E]very attorney under
[my] supervision is currently violating the [Missouri] Rules . . . . Their current caseloads create a conflict of interest with existing clients because they
are forced to choose effective representation of one client to the detriment of
other clients.” 258 Wallis then stated the District 13 office, which handles
Boone County and Cooper County cases, would no longer be immediately
entering appearances in cases wherein a defendant qualifies for representation
by MSPD. 259 Wallis wrote, “This is simply about ensuring all [District] 13
public defenders are able to maintain their license to practice law without
threat of discipline by OCDC.” 260
The Boone and Cooper County office “started an internal wait list for
defendants who qualify for representation.” 261 District 13 attorneys immediately handle cases for the accused in jail, 262 but wait list others – for how long
• Arranging for some cases to be assigned to private lawyers in return for reasonable compensation for their services;
• Urging prosecutors not to initiate criminal prosecutions when civil remedies
are adequate to address conduct and public safety does not require prosecution;
• Seeking emergency resources to deal with excessive workloads or exemptions from funding reductions;
• Negotiating formal and informal arrangements with courts or other appointing authorities respecting case assignments; and
• Notifying courts or other appointing authorities that the Provider is unavailable to accept additional appointments.

Id. (emphasis added).
257. Letter from David Wallis, Area 13 of the State Pub. Def. Sys., to Boone and
Cooper Cty. Courts (Oct. 2, 2017), http://boonecountybar.org/september-26-letterfrom-david-wallis-area-13-of-the-state-public-defender-system-to-boone-and-coopercounty-courts/ [hereinafter Letter from David Wallis].
258. Id.
259. See id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. In an interview with the Columbia Daily Tribune in October 2018, Michael
Barrett, Director of MSPD, said, “Right now that is the current policy in Boone County. If someone is incarcerated pretrial, they are not placed on the wait list. We represent them right away.” Pat Pratt, Director: Public Defenders Can’t ‘Keep Up’ with
Caseloads, COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Oct. 13, 2018, 1:46 PM),
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20181013/director-public-defenders-cantkeep-up-with-caseloads.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss4/12

30

Payne: Plight of the Public Defender: Excessive Caseload as a Non-Mitiga

2018]

PLIGHT OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER

1117

depends on the severity of the charges. 263 As of October 2018, the wait list
system was still in effect. 264 At times, the wait list included over 600 different cases. 265 In September 2018, state leaders gave Wallis’ office $100,000
to reduce the District 13 wait list. 266 District 13 used those funds in part to
contract with approximately twenty private attorneys to handle the “aging
cases on the wait list,” prioritizing felony cases that had been on the wait list
for over six months. 267
When the wait list was implemented, MSPD believed that, despite the
wait list creating longer case pendency, cases would actually be resolved
more expeditiously “once [MSPD] [was] able to ethically enter” and begin
work on them. 268 In October 2018, Wallis stated that District 13 attorneys
were doing better work and working longer hours because they were experiencing positive outcomes for their clients. 269 Wallis recognized, however,
that the improved work done on cases, particularly for the accused in custody,
came at the cost of others waiting months for legal help. 270 Nonetheless,
according to Michael Barrett, Director of MSPD, “[T]he wait list allows
[MSPD to provide] constitutionally competent representation for our existing
clients, which is in stark contrast to life before the wait lists.” 271
When he first made the wait list announcement in 2017, Wallis stated
his only ends were to achieve “effective, zealous and diligent representation
of poor persons by [attorneys] who are not under threat of Bar discipline by
OCDC.” 272 Wallis and his attorneys were not the only public defenders who
feared disciplinary action by OCDC. According to Barrett, “[MSPD] received a number of resignations in the hours following oral argument in [the

263. See Boone County Public Defenders Get More Money to Handle Wait List,
ABC17 NEWS (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.abc17news.com/news/boone-countypublic-defenders-get-more-money-to-handle-wait-list/818956576; see also Letter
from David Wallis, supra note 257 (explaining that they monitor an “attorney[s’]
work load and the wait list, and [then] assign[s] attorneys to cases based on custody
status and severity of the charge(s)”).
264. See Boone County Public Defenders Get More Money to Handle Wait List,
supra note 263.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Letter from David Wallis, supra note 257.
269. See Boone County Public Defenders Get More Money to Handle Wait List,
supra note 263.
270. Id.
271. Pratt, supra note 262.
272. Letter from David Wallis, supra note 257.
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Hinkebein] case.” 273 Barrett, in 2018, stated that the wait lists have helped
retain MSPD defenders post-Hinkebein. 274

D. Choosing to Privatize in Texas County
An alternative to the wait list system is the privatization of public defense work. MSPD has decided one Missouri county will do just that – as of
March 1, 2018, indigent defendants in rural Texas County will be appointed
private counsel, which the state of Missouri will pay for. 275
Texas County is home to approximately 26,000 residents. 276 In 2017,
MSPD opened roughly 530 cases in Texas County, with only one being handled by a privately contracted attorney. 277 Like most MSPD offices, the
problem with MSPD’s previous representation in Texas County was the excessive caseload. 278 In this instance, the large caseload was the result of a
single MSPD office – District 25 – representing six counties simultaneously. 279 According to MSPD’s annual report, the MSPD office responsible for
Texas County was assigned approximately 3,700 total cases in 2017. 280
There are only thirteen public defenders assigned to this particular office. 281
Thus, if cases were divided evenly, each attorney in this office would have
been assigned and responsible for almost 285 cases in 2017 alone. 282 That
equals a new case every 1.3 days. 283
It seems probable the outsized caseload took a toll on the public defenders working in this office. In a span of eighteen months, eleven out of
the thirteen attorneys quit. 284 Although the office re-hired as these attorneys
273. Letter from Michael Barrett, Dir. of the Mo. State Pub. Defs’ Office, to
Boone Cty. Bar Ass’n (Oct. 2, 2017), http://boonecountybar.org/letter-to-bcba-fromthe-director-of-the-missouri-state-public-defenders-office/.
274. Pratt, supra note 262 (“Before we did wait lists, it sent [MSPD attorneys]
packing . . . They feared for their law licenses and they left. If we don’t have wait
lists and they have too many cases they can’t handle, they say I’m afraid someone is
going to challenge my law license and I’m out of here.”).
275. Chadde, supra note 104.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See id.
279. Id.
280. Id. For comparison, that is almost one thousand fewer cases than St. Louis
County, which has a population five times greater than all six of District 25’s counties
combined. Id.
281. Id.
282. This number was calculated by taking the total number of cases assigned in
2017 (3,700) and dividing by the thirteen attorneys in the office (3,700/13 = 284.6).
283. This number was calculated by dividing the number of days in a year (365
excluding leap years) by the calculated number of cases an attorney in the MSPD
office representing Texas County was theoretically assigned in 2017 (365/285 =
1.28).
284. Chadde, supra note 104.
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left, a turnover rate of almost eighty-five percent in eighteen months is
enough to give pause. 285
The rate of compensation for contract work in Texas County will depend on the severity of the case, as is the standard for all of MSPD’s contract
work. An initial retainer fee is paid in accordance with the following guidelines, with additional compensation for cases resolved by trial.
Table 2. Private Attorney Compensation Rates 286

Description
Murder 1st Degree
Sexual Predator Trial
Sexual Predator Hearing
Other Homicide
AB Felony Drug
AB Felony Other
AB Felony Sex
CDE Felony Drug
CDE Felony Other
CDE Felony Sex
Misdemeanor
Juvenile - Non-Violent
Juvenile - Violent
Probation Violation
PCR Rule 24.035 Motion
PCR Rule 24.035 Evidentiary Hearing
PCR Rule 24.035 Appeal
PCR Rule 29.15 Motion
PCR Rule 29.15 Evidentiary Hearing
PCR Rule 29.15 Appeal
Direct Appeal

Contract
Guideline
$10,000
$8,000
$4,000
$6,000
$750
$1,500
$2,000
$750
$750
$1,500
$375
$500
$750
$375
$500
$250
$500
$1,000
$500
$1,875
$3,750

285. Id. This was found by dividing the number of attorneys who left by the
number of attorneys in the office (11/13 = 84.61).
286. This table is originally from Panel Attorney Opportunities and Contract
Rates, MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, https://publicdefender.mo.gov/private-counselopportunities/mspd-contracting/panel-rates/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2018). The following information is found below the table at its original source: “Jury Trial: $1,500 for
the first day and $750 for each additional day, partial days prorated. Bench Trial:
$750/day, partial days prorated.” Id.
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Despite the problems MSPD was facing in Texas County, there is no
guarantee private attorneys will step up to the plate. Representative Robert
Ross, R-Yukon, who represents Texas County, thinks they will. 287 He believes private attorneys will “love that opportunity for business.” 288
In fact, Ross is an advocate of privatizing nearly the entire MSPD system. On February 6, 2018, Ross introduced House Bill 2396 (“HB2396”),
which, though it never gained traction, would have mandated that certain
legal services provided to indigent defendants be contracted out to private
attorneys. 289 HB2396 would have repealed the provision allowing OSPD to
contract with private attorneys on a case-by-case basis only. 290 HB2396
would have instead commanded that “all class C, D, and E felony cases, all
misdemeanor cases, all traffic cases, and all probation violation cases” be
contracted out to private attorneys. 291 These cases make up almost ninety
percent of MSPD’s caseload, according to MSPD’s 2017 annual report. 292
Under this proposal, MSPD would have handled approximately nine percent
of its current caseload – Class A and B felonies such as murder, first-degree
robbery, and certain sex crimes. 293
HB2396 would have implemented a competitive bidding process for
awarding contacts to private attorneys. 294 Under HB2396, contracts would
have been awarded to the lowest bidder, but “priority” would have been “given to bidders who exhibit experience in criminal law, demonstrate the capacity to provide effective representation in all assigned cases, and carry sufficient malpractice insurance.” 295 Bids would have been subject to and approved by the presiding judge of the judicial circuit where the services were
to be rendered. 296
Despite its curb appeal, a low-bid contract system such as that contemplated by HB2396 would most likely cost the state more money instead of
saving it money. Private attorneys are very unlikely to bid on contracts at the
extremely low cost that MSPD expends per case. On average, MSPD spent
only $325 per trial division case disposition in 2017, 297 and private attorneys
287. Chadde, supra note 104.
288. Id.
289. H.R. 2396, 99th Gen.

Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018),
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills181/hlrbillspdf/6205H.01I.pdf.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See MISSOURI PUBLIC DEFENDER COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL
REPORT 20 (2017),
https://archive.org/details/2017MOPublicDefenderAnnRpt/page/n0 [hereinafter
FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT]; see also Chadde, supra note 104.
293. Chadde, supra note 104.
294. H.R. 2396.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. FISCAL YEAR 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 292, at 13 (2017) (“The
average direct cost of all cases disposed by [MSPD] (including Death Penalty Repre-
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are exceptionally unlikely to make bids this low – many experienced, private
criminal defense lawyers make almost that much per hour. 298 Further, legislation like HB2396 raises concerns about ensuring competent representation –
awarding cases to attorneys with the lowest bids will result in lessexperienced lawyers (perhaps not always even criminal defense lawyers)
receiving cases more often than experienced lawyers whose time is worth
more. 299 This Note does not attempt to touch on all of the potential problems
inherent to large-scale privatization, but such a drastic measure ought not be
considered lightly. 300
Adequate funding would negate the desire to privatize MSPD, but Missouri has been battling a severe budget crisis, 301 and creative methods for
funding would be required. 302 Scholars have proposed re-examining criminal offenses – “reducing more misdemeanors to infractions or civil forfeitures” 303 – and “check[ing] spiraling corrections budgets” 304 as a means of
saving money that can be funneled to MSPD.

sentation) in Fiscal Year 2017 was $396.52. The Trial Division average was just
$325.31.”).
298. See Heather Cole, Compare & Contrast: Missouri Lawyer Price Range from
$65 to $793 Per Hour, MO. LAW. WKLY. (June 17, 2013),
https://molawyersmedia.com/2013/06/17/compare-contrast-missouri-lawyer-pricesrange-from-65-to-793-per-hour/.
299. The word “priority” is not absolute. The possibility would still exist that a
low bidder – one without enough experience to make them qualified – wins a bid
because it is markedly lower than a more qualified attorney. Moreover, “experience
in criminal law” is a vague standard, and the proposal made no attempt to define what
constitutes “experience.” Similarly, the proposal made no attempt to define what
constitutes the “capacity to provide effective representation in all assigned cases.”
HB2396 attempted to hedge these equivocal standards by creating a quality assurance
program. See H.R. 2396. With the assistance of the presiding judge in each circuit,
the quality assurance program would have sought “to ensure that defendants are being
provided quality representation by private attorneys awarded contracts . . . .” Id.
300. For a broader discussion of historically deficient systems of privatization, see
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL
REPORT (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf.
301. See generally Phill Brooks, Missouri Heading for a Looming Budget Cliff,
COLUM. DAILY TRIB. (Jan. 28, 2018),
http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/20180128/missouri-heading-for-loomingbudget-cliff.
302. See Rodney Uphoff, Foreword, Broke and Broken: Can We Fix our State
Indigent Defense System?, 75 MO. L. REV. 667 (2010) for proposed solutions on saving money that could then be allocated to the public defender system.
303. Id. at 675.
304. Id. at 676.
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V. CONCLUSION
Since 2005, many efforts have been undertaken to improve MSPD’s
hand-in-hand problems of underfunding and excessive caseload, yet none
have proved particularly effective. 305 Until adequate funding is provided that
allows for more attorneys and reasonable caseloads throughout the system,
public defenders will continue to face circumstances that make it difficult to
comply with the Missouri Rules, and indigent defendants will suffer. Without a workable systemic solution, mandates from the ABA, such as those
found in the ABA’s Formal Opinion, can alleviate the problem only so much.
This leaves public defenders in a catch-22 situation. Hinkebein suggests
that if a public defender cannot find relief through the chain of command or
court order, quitting may be the necessary solution. Not only are public defenders unlikely to be keen on quitting, but if quitting is the necessary solution following unmet requests for remedial relief, MSPD and the public will
be harmed by the loss of experienced and skilled public defenders – resignations would exacerbate MSPD’s already high turnover rates and its continuing inability to reassign cases to less burdened attorneys. Nonetheless,
Hinkebein serves as a warning to Missouri public defenders: Even the hardworking and highly motivated defender who continues on in the face of an
excessive caseload faces the possibility of sanctions for ethical violations –
sanctions that will not be mitigated by the public defender’s excessive caseload. Public defenders are “risking their professional lives,” indeed.

305. See generally ABA, MO PUBLIC DEFENDER CASELOAD RELIEF EFFORTS
TIMELINE (2012),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
2012/02/annual_summit_onindigentdefenseimprovement/ls_sclaid_annual_review_gr
oss_mo_pub_def.authcheckdam.pdf.
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